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CASE SUMMARY 
DIRTY PROPERTY FOR DIRT CHEAP: 
CGL COVERAGE FOR THE 
DIMINISHED VALUE OF 
CONTAMINATED SITES UNDER 
GOODSTEIN V. CONTINENTAL 
CASUALTY CO. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Goodstein v. Continental Casualty CO.,l the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the diminution in sale value of 
property due to pollution does not constitute "property damage" under a 
comprehensive general liability insurance policy where the sale contract 
did not require the buyer to remediate as a condition of the sale.2 In so 
holding, the court found that diminished property value is not "physical 
injury to tangible property," nor is it "damage" that the "insured shall 
become legally obligated to pay" because of "property damage.,,3 
However, without determining whether the mere designation of property 
as environmentally contaminated by the Washington State Department of 
Ecology is a "suit," the Ninth Circuit held that such classification may 
still trigger the insurer's duty to defend.4 
I Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2007). 
2 1d. at 1046. 
3 1d. at 1054. 
4 See id. at 1055. 
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. THE STERNOFF PROPERTIES 
Partnerships comprised of members of the Sternoff family jointly 
owned two industrial properties in Washington: a three-acre site on 
Marginal Way ("the Marginal property") in Seattle and a twelve-acre site 
in Renton ("the Renton property,,).5 For forty-five years, the Sternoffs 
operated a scrap metal salvage yard at the Marginal property that caused 
ground pollution.6 For approximately twenty years, the Sternoffs 
recycled scrap metal and electrical equipment at the Renton property, 
resulting in hazardous waste byproducts containing high concentrations 
of soluble lead.7 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Washington State 
Department of Ecology ("DOE") identified the two properties as 
environmentally contaminated, and listed them as hazardous sites under 
the Model Toxics Control Act of Washington ("MTCA,,).8 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Sternoff partners had a series of 
disagreements among themselves, and they were unable to continue 
operating their various businesses.9 On March 29, 1990, the King 
County Superior Court dissolved the partnerships and appointed Robert 
Goodstein ("Goodstein") as receiver to liquidate the partnership assets. 10 
The court allowed Goodstein to proceed with remediation of the 
contaminated properties as necessary or to sell the properties without 
remediation. ll Goodstein presented two options to the receivership 
court: (1) sell the properties at a discounted sales price "as is" to account 
for the pollution, or (2) remediate the pollution and then sell the 
properties. 12 The court approved a plan to sell the two properties "as 
is.,,13 
5/d. at 1046; see also Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., 509 
F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-35805). 
6 Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1046. 
7/d. 
S The Model Toxics Control Act of Washington imposes strict liability for the remediation 
of environmental hazards upon any person who owned or operated a facility at which hazardous 
substances were released. Wash. Rev. Code § 70.l05D.040 CHECK BB FORMAT ON TillS); see 
also Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1046 n.2 (citing Olds-Olympic, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 918 
P.2d 923, 927 (Wash. 1996)). 
9 Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1046. 
10 /d.; see also Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042 
(9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-35805). 
II Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1046. 
12 [d. at 1047. 
13 [d. 
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In 1996, Goodstein sold the Renton property for $3,001,000, and in 
1998, he sold the Marginal property for $500,000. 14 The sales 
agreements disclosed that both properties were polluted and required the 
purchasers to assume responsibility for any cleanup that may be 
required. IS Both agreements also provided that "[no] amendment, 
change or modification of [the agreements] shall be valid, unless in 
writing and signed by the parties hereto.,,16 However, the agreements did 
not commit the purchasers to remediate the properties on their own. 17 
B. THE INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE POLICIES 
Industrial Indemnity Company ("Industrial") issued primary and 
excess insurance policies to the Sternoffs between 1980 and 1986.18 The 
initial coverage grants in these Comprehensive General Liability 
("CGL") policies 19 state that "[Industrial] will pay on behalf of the 
insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay 
as damages because of [property damage]" to which this insurance 
applies .. 20 Under the policies, Industrial assumed "the right and duty to 
defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of 
such ... property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are 
groundless, false or fraudulent.,,21 Further, "the policies required the 
Sternoffs to provide written notice of an 'occurrence' to Industrial 'as 
soon as practicable,' and, in the event a claim or suit is asserted against 
the Sternoffs, to 'immediately forward' to Industrial all 'demand, notice, 
summons or other process' received by the Sternoffs.'.22 The policies 
defined an "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or 




17 Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007). 
18 [d. 
19 Comprehensive General Liability policies provide general liability coverage for 
commercial and business entities. In 1986, the revision of the CGL standard policy eliminated the 
word "comprehensive" and substituted it with "commercial." Although both use the acronym 
"CGL" and are called "CGL policies," there are significant coverage differences between the two. 
NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE 30-24 (Leo Martinez, Marc S. Mayerson & 
Douglas R. Richmond eds., 2007). 
20 Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1047; see also Appellees' Response Brief at 4, Goodstein v. Cont'l 
Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-35805). 
21 Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1047. 
22/d. 
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neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.,,23 The 
policies did not define "damages," "claim." or "suit.,,24 
C. COMMUNICATION BETWEEN GOODSTEIN AND INDUSTRIAL 
On September 28, 1990, Goodstein notified Industrial by letter that 
the Washington DOE had identified the Marginal and Renton properties 
as contaminated and that a study was underway to assess the damage and 
cleanup costS. 25 Goodstein requested copies of the relevant policies and 
stated that "Sternoff may make a claim for cleanup and related costs 
under the insurance policies.,,26 On October, 19, 1990, Industrial 
acknowledged receipt of the claim27 and indicated that it was attempting 
to find the Sternoff policies. 28 
On October 22, 1990, Goodstein acknowledged receipt of 
Industrial's October 19, 1990 letter, but stated: "Please note, however, in 
case there is any confusion, we are not presently making any claims 
under th[ else policies. At present, we are simply asking to obtain copies 
of any policies, applications, etc. relating to insurance provided by 
Industrial Indemnity to Sternoff.,,29 Industrial did not receive any further 
correspondence regarding the Sternoff policies and in December 1992, 
closed the file for "lack of activity.,,3o Because no claim was filed, 
Industrial did not issue a coverage position letter to Goodstein. 31 
On September 25, 1998, eight years after Goodstein indicated to 
Industrial that he was "not presently making any claims," Goodstein 
notified Industrial of the sale of the Renton and Marginal properties. 32 In 
that letter, Goodstein also stated that the extent of the contamination of 
the properties had been investigated and that he was now in a position to 
settle the environmental claims related to those properties. 33 Goodstein 




261d. at 1047-1048 (emphasis in original). 
27 Internal documents indicated that Industrial understood the September 28, 1990 letter to be 
asserting a claim for the cleanup and other related costs; see Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 
1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007). 
28/d. 




33 Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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property and $4.839 million for the loss on the Renton property.34 These 
amounts were calculated based on the "appraised value of the sites if 
uncontaminated less the sales price of the sites in their contaminated 
condition.,,35 Industrial responded by disclaiming any coverage under 
the policies for the losses claimed by Goodstein on behalf of the 
Sternoffs.36 
D. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2002, Goodstein filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that 
"Industrial owed a duty to defend and to indemnify Goodstein under the 
CGL policies, and ... for breach of contract based on Industrial's failure 
to fulfill those duties.,,37 Industrial moved for summary judgment on the 
grounds that the claimed losses from the property sales were not covered 
by the policies and that Goodstein never invoked the duty to defend.38 
In opposition to the summary judgment motion, Goodstein offered a 
declaration as evidence that he had entered into an oral cross-assignment 
agreemene9 with Zelman Renton LLC ("Zelman"), the purchaser of the 
Renton property.40 The declaration stated that the cross-assignment 
agreement had "not yet been finalized. ,,41 Goodstein did not submit any 
evidence of the transfer and cross-transfer of rights in support of his 
opposition to summary judgment. 42 
The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington granted Industrial's motion for summary judgment, finding 
that Industrial did not have a duty to defend or a duty to indemnify 
Goodstein under the pOlicies.43 The court did not consider the evidence 
purporting to establish the cross-assignment of rights.44 
Goodstein filed a motion for reconsideration along with a written 
cross-assignment agreement and a new declaration, stating that "all the 





38 1d. at 1048-49. 
39 Goodstein and Zelman agreed that all rights that Goodstein had to insurance coverage for 
environmental contamination would be transferred to Zelman, and Zelman would transfer those 
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by, agreed to, and known to the parties as of January 27, 2005.'.45 The 
district court denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that 
Goodstein failed to comply with the local rules governing such 
motions.46 On appeal, Goodstein challenged the district court's failure to 
consider the cross-assignment evidence at the summary judgment and 
reconsideration stages, as well as the court's grant of summary judgment 
for Industrial on Goodstein's duty to defend and duty to indemnify 
c1aims.47 
II. NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 
A. CONSIDERATION OF CRosS-ASSIGNMENT EVIDENCE 
The Ninth Circuit began its discussion by rejecting Goodstein's 
assertion that his declaration properly served as evidence of the cross-
assignment of rights between Zelman and Goodstein.48 Goldstien 
purported that the purpose of the agreement, was "to ensure that all rights 
to insurance coverage for environmental damage at the Renton site 
[were] consolidated and assigned to the Receiver,,,49 and to "put to rest 
any argument that the claim for coverage was an 'economic loss' and not 
covered damages under the policies.,,50 
While Washington law allows the assignment of insurance rights,51 
the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
by declining to consider evidence of the cross-assignment. 52 First, 
contrary to Goodstein's assertion, the declaration did not state that the 
parties had reached a definitive agreement.53 Second, the agreement 
45 Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2007). 
46 ld.; see infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
47 1d. 
48 See id. at 1050. Because the policies at issue provide coverage for third-party liability and 
not first-party injury, the insurer is only liable for such damages that "the insured shall become 
legally obligated to pay" to a third-party; see id. at 1052. Therefore, in order to avail himself of the 
coverage provided by the policies, Goodstein entered into the cross-assignment agreement with 
Zelman; see id. at 1049. Third-party insurance covers the insured for liability it incurs to another 
party, while first-party insurance provides coverage for injury to the insured's own property; see 
Olds-Olympic, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 923, 930 (Wash. 1996) (citing 
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 874 P.2d 142 (Wash. 1994)). 
49 See Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2007). 
50 Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 
2007) (No. 05-35805). 
51 See Public Utility Dist. No. I of Klickitat County v. Int'l Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 1020, 1027 
(Wash. 1994) (holding that an assignment of insurance rights is valid "if made after the events 
giving rise to liability have already occurred when the assignment is made."). 
52 Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1050. 
53 [d. 
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executed by Goodstein and Zelman, which the cross-assignment sought 
to modify, provided that "[no] amendment, change or modification of 
[the agreements] shall be valid, unless in writing, and signed by the 
parties hereto.,,54 Lastly, the declaration did not disclose the essential 
terms of the cross-assignment agreement, including the consideration 
that supported the agreement. 55 
The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court properly declined 
to reverse its summary judgment ruling upon Goodstein's motion for 
reconsideration. 56 In support of his motion, Goodstein asserted that 
although the cross-assignment agreement was not memorialized in 
writing when he submitted the original declaration in opposition to 
summary judgment, "all the material terms had been negotiated by, 
agreed to, and known to the parties as of January 27, 2005.,,57 The 
district court, however, ruled that Goodstein failed to meet the standard 
laid out in the local rules.58 Local Rule 7(h) of the Western District of 
Washington provides that motions for reconsideration will only be 
granted upon a "showing of new facts ... which could not have been 
brought to [the court's] attention earlier with reasonable diligence.,,59 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, finding that Goodstein's 
motion "fails of its own weight.,,6o The panel held that according to 
Goodstein's motion, the precise terms of the cross-assignment agreement 
were agreed to and known to the parties, and therefore, could have been 
brought to the district court's attention in January of 2005.61 As such, 
Goodstein failed to meet the standard imposed by Local Rule 7(h).62 
Because it concluded that the district court properly declined to consider 
evidence of the cross-assignment, the Ninth Circuit did not consider the 
possible impact of the cross-assignment agreement on Goodstein's 
substantive claims for coverage under the CGL policies.63 
B. DIMINISHED VALUE OF PROPERTY AS COVERED DAMAGES 
The Ninth Circuit next considered Goodstein's assertion that 
Industrial had a duty to indemnify Goodstein for the difference between 
54 1d. at 1047 (alteration in original). 
55 1d. at 1050. 
56 Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., 509 FJd 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). 
57 1d. 
58 1d. 
59 W.O. Wash. Local R. 7(h) (cited in Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1051) (alteration in original). 
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the sale price of the polluted properties and the fair market value of the 
land had it been remediated prior to the sale.64 Goodstein argued that the 
diminution in value of the land due to the pollution is the "functional 
approximation" of the cost to remediate the properties and as such, 
should be covered under a CGL pOlicy.65 While the Ninth Circuit agreed 
with the district court's conclusion that the policy did not provide for 
indemnity of such costs, it disagreed with the rationale asserted by the 
district court in reaching that conclusion.66 
The district court found that the policy provision that required 
Industrial to pay all sums "on behalf of the insured," rather than to the 
insured, must be read literally.67 Therefore, the policy required Industrial 
to provide indemnity to the insured only for another's loss, not for the 
insured's own loss.68 
The Ninth Circuit declined to follow the district court's strict 
adherence to the distinction between fIrst and third-party insurance. 69 
Relying on Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety CO.,70 the Ninth 
Circuit found that the Washington Supreme Court "has demonstrated a 
marked willingness to take a view of policy language in the context of 
insurance coverage for environmental cleanup claims suffIciently 
expansive to preclude such literalism.,,7l Interpreting a CGL policy 
identical to the one in Goodstein, the Washington Supreme Court held in 
Boeing that a third-party liability policy does cover remediation costs, 
even though the insurer was to pay the insured for costs incurred. 72 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that "Goodstein's claim cannot fail 
simply because it is not a request for a payment made to a harmed third 
party.'.73 
However, the Goodstein court found that the diminished sale value 
of the polluted property was not the "functional approximation" of 
remediation costS.74 First, the sales contracts for the two properties did 
not require the buyer to remediate the pollution as a condition of the 
64 ld. 
65 [d. at lOS2. 
66 See Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., S09 F.3d 1042, 10S1 (9th CiT. 2007). 
67 [d. at IOS2. 
68 See id. 
ff) [d. at IOSI-S2. 
70 Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & SUT. Co., 784 P.2d S07 (Wash. 1990) (en bane). 
71 Goodstein, S09 F.3d at 10S2. 
72 Boeing, 784 P.2d at S16; see also Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., S09 F.3d 1042, 10S2 (9th 
CiT. 2007). 
73 Goodstein, S09 F.3d at 10S2. 
74 See id. 
8
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sale. 75 On the contrary, records showed that while one of the properties 
was cleaned up by the buyer, the other remained polluted almost ten 
years after the sale and over fifteen years after it was first identified as 
contaminated. 76 
Second, the court concluded that the reduced purchase price 
represented a calculation based on the probable cost of remediation 
discounted by the probability that the costs would actually be incurred. 77 
"The reduction in price for the cleanup costs was thus almost surely not 
equivalent in amount to the present cost of prompt cleanup.,,7s 
Lastly, diminution in sale value alone, the court stated, cannot 
constitute "property damage" where the policy language requires 
"physical injury to tangible property.,,79 While clean up costs incurred in 
response to environmental agency action can constitute "property 
damage,"SO Washington courts "have never extended such interpretation 
to include diminution in property value as a surrogate for response costs 
never incurred.,,81 Further, Goodstein did not "constructively" incur 
costs for remediation when the sale was not conditioned on remediation 
by the buyer using the money saved from the diminished purchase 
. 82 pnce. 
In support of his position, Goodstein cited two Washington 
Supreme Court cases that held that response costs could constitute 
"property damage" under similar CGL policies: 1) Boeing Co. v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co., noted above, and 2) Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety CO. 83 In Boeing, the Washington Supreme Court 
considered whether environmental response costs paid by the insured as 
a result of actions by the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act ("CERCLA,,)84 constituted "damages" within the meaning 
of the CGL policies issued by the insurers.85 Applying Washington's 
"plain meaning rule,,,86 the Boeing court held that response costs incurred 
75 1d. 
76 See id. at 1053. 
77 See id. 
78 Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). 
79 1d. at 1054. 
80 See id. (citing Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 874 P.2d 142, 145 (Wash. 
1994)(en bane); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 5 IS (Wash. 1990) (en bane)). 
81 Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1054. 
82 ld. 
83 See id. at 1052. 
84 42 U.S.C.A § 9601 (West 2008). 
85 See Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 509 (Wash. 1990) (en bane). 
86 See id. at 511 (citing Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 549 P.2d 9, 11 (Wash. 1976)) ("Undefined 
9
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under CERCLA are "damages" to the extent that those costs were 
incurred "because of' property damage within the meaning of the CGL 
policies.87 
In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety CO.,88 the 
Washington Supreme Court took Boeing a step further and held that 
where the insured incurred response costs based on liability imposed by 
an environmental statute, those costs are "damages" within the meaning 
of a CGL policy, even if incurred prior to any adversarial agency 
action.89 The Weyerhaeuser court found that requiring an insured to wait 
to be sued before receiving the benefits of its insurance policy would be 
inconsistent with the insured's contractual duty to mitigate damages, as 
well as the public policy of encouraging prompt action to protect the 
public health and environment.9o 
The Goodstein court distinguished Boeing and Weyerhaeuser from 
the instant case in one crucial respect: "[t]he plaintiffs in Boeing and 
Weyerhaeuser actually cleaned up the polluted land, thus remedying the 
harm to the public caused by the contamination. The covered damages 
were incurred as part of that effort.,,91 The sales contract for the Sternoff 
properties could not be the functional equivalent of the claims in Boeing 
and Weyerhaeuser when neither contract required the purchaser to 
actually remediate the pollution as a condition of the sale.92 As a result, 
the Ninth Circuit affIrmed the district court's holding that Industrial had 
no duty to indemnify Goodstein for the loss in sale value of the polluted 
properties. 93 
C. DUTY TO DEFEND POTENTIALLY COVERED CLAlMS 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit considered Goodstein's assertion that the 
DOE's allegations of contamination created a duty to defend since claims 
for environmental remediation are potentially covered under the 
Industrial policy.94 In reversing the district court's grant of summary 
judgment, the Ninth Circuit held that Goodstein invoked the duty to 
terms in an insurance contract must be given their 'plain, ordinary, and popular' meaning."). 
87 See Boeing, 784 P.2d at 516. 
88 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 874 P.2d 142 (Wash. 1994) (en bane). 
89 See id. at 154. 
90 See id. at 153-154. 
91 Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). 
92 [d. 
93 See id. at 1054. 
94 See id. at 1055. 
10
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defend by filing the lawsuit against Industrial and that duty began at the 
time of the DOE action and ended upon the sale of the properties. 95 
An insurer has a duty to defend when the insurance policy 
"conceivably" covers the allegations:96 "[a]n insurer's duty to defend an 
action brought against its insured arises when a complaint against the 
insured, construed liberally, alleges facts which could, if proven, impose 
liability upon the insured within the policy's coverage. ,,97 But Industrial 
only assumes the duty to defend a "suit against the insured seeking 
damages. ,,98 Whether the DOE's declaration of the Sternoff properties as 
polluted constituted a "suit" within the meaning of the policy is an open 
and unresolved issue under Washington law.99 Since Industrial did not 
argue that the DOE action was not a "suit," the Ninth Circuit declined to 
resolve the issue,loo and instead, the Ninth Circuit assumed that the DOE 
designation of the properties was a "SUit."IOI So assuming, the Goodstein 
court ruled that "environmental response costs can constitute covered 
'damages' under CGL policies" and held that the DOE action implicated 
Industrial's duty to defend. 102 
The duty to defend and the duty to indemnify are separate 
obligations, and courts examine them independently. 103 Therefore, the 
fact that Goodstein did not pay any response costs is irrelevant to 
whether a duty to defend existed while those costs were potentially 
payable. I04 The court only looks to whether the claims asserted against 
the insured were potentially covered under the policy.105 "An insurer's 
duty to defend is a continuing one, and does not end until the underlying 
action is resolved or it is shown that there is no potential for 
coverage."I06 As such, the Goodstein court found that when Goodstein 
sold the properties without performing remediation, he converted the 
response costs, which were potentially covered under the policies, into an 
95 1d. at 1060. 
96 See id. at lOSS (citing Woo v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 164 P.3d 454, 459 (Wash. 2007) 
(en banc». 
97 Unigard Ins. Co. v. Leven, 983 P.2d 1150, 1160 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). 
98 Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007). 
99 See id. at 1055. 
100 See id. 
101/d. 
102/d. (emphasis added). 
103 See id. (citing Dewitt Constr. Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th 
Cir. 2002». 
104 See Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1055. 
105 See id. 
106 Overton v. Con sol. Ins. Co., 38 P.3d 322, 344 (Wash. 2002) (en bane) (quoted in 
Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007». 
11
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economic loss that clearly fell outside the scope of coverage. I07 Thus, 
Industrial's duty to defend began at the time of the DOE action and 
terminated when Goodstein sold the properties. 108 The Ninth Circuit 
held that if Goodstein can establish a breach of the duty to defend, he 
will be able to recover any pre-transfer costs incurred in defending, 
including any costs incurred in investigating the environmental 
contamination, such as the costs of hiring an expert to assess the 
pollution. 109 
i. invocation of the Duty to Defend 
Goodstein asserted that his September 28, 1990 letter invoked the 
duty to defend because it gave Industrial notice of the fact that the DOE 
had declared the properties polluted. llD However, Washington law 
requires more than just providing notice to the insurer of a claim: III "the 
insured must affIrmatively inform the insurer that its participation is 
desired." I 12 The Goodstein court found that Goodstein had done the 
opposite; Goodstein made clear that he was not invoking coverage under 
the policies. ll3 In his October 22, 1990 letter, Goodstein specifically 
stated that he was "not presently making any claims under the 
policies." 114 
Industrial asserted that no showing of prejudice was necessary 
because Goodstein never invoked the duty to defend in the first place. 115 
While the Ninth Circuit found Industrial's position to be creative, the 
court was not persuaded. ll6 Under Washington's late notice rule, in 
order to avoid liability for defense costs, an insurer must prove that the 
insured's delay in tendering the defense claim caused the insurer actual 
and substantial prejudice. 117 
107 See Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1055. 
108 [d. at 1056. 
109 The measure of damages for a breach of the duty to defend is the costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred by the insured in defending itself plus any consequential damages as a result 
of the breach; see id. at 1058 n.20 (quoting Underwriters at Lloyds v. Denali Seafoods, Inc., 927 
F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir. 1991)). The court found that the discounted sales price could not have been 
caused by Industrial's failure to defend because Goodstein did not invoke the duty to defend until he 
filed this lawsuit, which was after he had already sold the properties for the discounted price; see id. 
110 See Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007). 
III See id. 
112 [d. (quoting Unigard Ins. Co. v. Leven, 983 P.2d II SO, 1160 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)). 
113 See id. 
114 See id. at 1048; see also id. at 1056. 
115 See Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1056. 
116 See id. at 1056. 
117 See Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2(07) (citing Mutual 
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The Ninth Circuit held that the fact that Goodstein may never have 
tendered a defense claim to Industrial before filing this lawsuit did not 
relieve Industrial of its obligation to prove prejudice. 118 The court held 
that "[t]he filing of the lawsuit itself constitutes a request for payment of 
defense costs under the policy, and at that point, the late notice rule 
applies.,,119 The court found that Goodstein's failure to deman a defense 
precluded coverage absent a showing of prejudice. 120 "[E]ven if a claim 
for defense costs is ... asserted in the form of a coverage suit rather than 
by a letter to the insurer demanding a defense or submitting defense 
costs, the insurance company is still liable for the defense costs absent 
evidence of substantial prejudice." 121 
2. Evidence of Substantial Prejudice 
The Ninth Circuit held that Industrial could not establish prejudice 
as a matter of law. 122 To establish prejudice, Industrial had to 
"demonstrate some concrete detriment, some specific advantage lost or 
disadvantage created, which hard] an identifiable prejudicial effect on 
[Industrial's] ability to evaluate, prepare or present its defenses to 
coverage or liability.,,123 The court found that there was no evidence to 
suggest that Industrial could have taken any steps to mitigate or dispute 
Goodstein's liability for the pollution or that Industrial was in any other 
way damaged by Goodstein's alleged breach of its obligations under the 
policy. 124 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's 
grant of summary judgment for Industrial on the duty to defend claim. 125 
The Goodstein court, however, emphasized that this decision was 
not expressing a view on whether Industrial actually owed a duty to 
defend under the policies. 126 Rather, the decision merely established that 
Industrial could not prove substantial prejudice as a matter of law to 
warrant the grant of summary judgment. 127 The Ninth Circuit left it up to 
of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. USF Ins. Co., 153 P.3d 877, 882 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); Public Utility Dist. 
No. I of Klickitat County v. Int'I Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 1020, 1029 (Wash. 1994) (en banc); Griffin v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 29 P.3d 777, 782 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)). 
118 [d. at 1058. 
119 [d. at 1057. 
120 [d. at 1058. 
121/d. (relying on Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. USF Ins. Co., 153 P.3d 877, 882 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2007)). 
122 Goodstein v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007). 
123 [d. (citing Unigard Ins. Co. v. Leven, 983 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)). 
124 See id. at 1059. 
I2S Id. at 1060. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
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the district court, on remand, to determine whether there was a duty to 
defend based on these facts, and, if so, whether any damages were 
incurred as a result of the breach. 128 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit decision in Goodstein v. Continental Casualty 
Co. stands for the proposition that the diminished sale value of polluted 
property is not a covered "property damage" under a CGL policy where 
the sale contract did not require the buyer to remediate as a condition of 
the sale. 129 This holding appears to be consistent with Washington law; 
by selling the property "as is" and without requiring the buyer to clean 
up the property, Goodstein did not actually pay any sums it was 
obligated to pay under the MTCA or CERLCA. 130 
More significant, however, is the Ninth Circuit's treatment of what 
constitutes a "suit" for purposes of the duty to defend. In finding that 
Industrial might still have a duty to defend Goodstein, the Ninth Circuit 
assumed that the DOE action was a "suit" for purposes of defining the 
insurer's defense obligations under the CGL policy.13I In the words of 
the Goodstein court, what constitutes a "suit" for purposes of the duty to 
defend in environmental cleanup cases is an issue that the Washington 
Supreme Court has "repeatedly declined to resolve.,,132 
However, by proceeding to find a duty to defend under the 
assumption that mere designation of property as polluted is a "suit" 
under a CGL policy, the Goodstein court may have opened the door for 
policyholders who have cleaned up property without putting their 
insurers on notice to claim retroactive payments for site investigation 
costs. 133 In addition, as one commentator stated, "[b]y the court's own 
logic, that 'suit' would not terminate until the property was fully 
remediated and removed from the cleanup list. Until [the DOE] does so, 
the 'suit' would remain active and Goodstein would remain exposed to 
enforcement by the state and potential contribution actions by subsequent 
owners. ,,134 
bane). 
128 See id. 
129 See Goodstein v. Cont'! Cas. Co., 509 F.3d \042, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). 
130 See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 874 P.2d 142, 151 (Wash. 1994) (en 
\31 See Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1055. 
\32 See id. 
133 Linda Larson & Dustin Till, Marten Law Group, Ninth Circuit Decides the Diminished 
Value of Contaminated Sites Is Not Covered by Insurance under Washington Law (January 30, 
2008), http://www.martenlaw.com/news/?20080 130-contaminated-sites. 
134 Linda Larson & Dustin Till, Marten Law Group, Ninth Circuit Decides the Diminished 
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The Washington Supreme Court's en banc decision In 
Weyerhaeuser took a step closer to finding that mere designation of 
property as polluted without an overt threat of litigation is a "suit" within 
the meaning of a CGL policy. 135 Goodstein expands on Weyerhaeuser in 
holding that a duty to defend may exist based on the mere designation of 
property by an environmental agency.136 Whether Washington courts or 
other jurisdictions will follow the Goodstein court's assumption that 
mere designation by an environmental agency constitutes a "suit" 
remains to be seen. 
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135 See Weyerhaeuser, 874 P.2d at 154 (finding coverage under a CGL policy "where there 
has been property damage and where a policyholder is liable pursuant to an environmental statute."). 
136 See supra notes 95-110 and accompanying text. 
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